How Could NATO’s Role Change as the U.S. Rethinks Its Security Commitments?

SECURITY

November 13, 2026

For decades, NATO offered Washington a bargain: the United States provided the alliance with military power, nuclear protection, and intelligence. In return, it gained political influence in Europe and access to an extensive network of bases.

Washington is beginning to rethink its side of that bargain. In 2025, NATO members agreed to spend a combined 5% of GDP on defense and related security investments by 2035. The White House describes the agreement as a step toward making European allies less dependent on the United States. In 2026, the Trump administration spoke of bringing U.S. troop levels in Europe back to where they stood before 2022 and giving Europeans greater responsibility for their own defense.

The appeal for Washington is clear. If allies cover more of the cost, the United States can devote more resources elsewhere. Higher European defense budgets can also mean more business for American manufacturers. According to the White House, NATO allies bought more than $54 billion worth of U.S. defense equipment in 2025. Washington wants to spend less on Europe’s defense while keeping its political influence and its share of the arms market.

In “The Alternative,” Alexander Zhuravsky imagines what might happen if Washington went much further in rethinking its commitments abroad.
In the novel, President Elon Musk concludes that a country carrying as much debt as the United States can no longer afford to station forces around the world on the same scale. He begins cutting the number of overseas bases, reviewing military spending, and seeking deals directly with Russia and China.

That decision changes how Washington conducts foreign policy. The United States gradually gives up maintaining a military presence around the globe as its principal means of influence. Instead, it negotiates with other major powers. As the European Union and NATO break apart, most European countries find themselves in one sphere of influence or another.

By the time Musk travels to the Second Yalta Conference, he can no longer speak for a unified Western bloc. He has to secure terms the United States can afford. The United States, Russia, and China negotiate directly over arms reductions, American bases, debt obligations, and the rules of a new international order. The negotiations will shape Europe’s future, but European governments have little say in setting the terms.

What Musk sees as a budget necessity looks very different from the Pentagon or the boardroom of a defense contractor. Closing a base costs some officials political influence. Cutting an arms program costs manufacturers orders in a market they have counted on for decades.
In the novel, senior military figures and arms industry executives speak openly about what they stand to lose from an easing of tensions. If Washington cuts its arsenal, closes bases, and stays out of more conflicts abroad, contractors will have fewer orders to fill. The Pentagon will also have a harder time making the case for a military establishment of its current size.

That is why some of the strongest resistance to Musk comes from inside the United States. Political insiders, Pentagon officials, defense contractors, and financial interests all have reasons to preserve a system that has given them income and political influence for decades.

The novel leaves a question for NATO today. If Washington cuts the cost of maintaining forces around the world, the alliance will have to decide what greater European responsibility means in practice: how much of their defense Europeans will pay for, and how much authority they will have to shape it.